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VANITY FARE:
THE COST, CONTROVERSY, AND ART OF FASHION
ADVERTISEMENT RETOUCHING
KERRY C. DONOVAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The cover of the June 2010 edition of Marie Claire magazine
featured the lovely forty-five-year-old Sarah Jessica Parker, look-
ing impossibly gorgeous.' This impossibility is not a testament to
her natural appearance-it is the work of photoshopping.2 Her
hands look almost like a newborn's hands on the body of a
woman. They are smooth and plastic-like, and show no trace of
the veins and wrinkles that exist naturally.
London Fog made Christina Hendricks, of Mad Men fame, the
face of its fall 2010 advertisement campaign, because they found
that she was "sexy and gorgeous" with a modern appeal that com-
plemented perfectly what the company was seeking to represent.'
However, the actual campaign showed a Hendricks whose waist
had been made smaller, and whose hips were less wide.4 Appar-
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2012. Many thanks to my
parents Bob and Marianne Donovan for their encouragement and support,
Professor Jane Simon for her help and advice not only with this Note, but with
all my legal writing, Kevin Pfeiffer for his patience with hearing me talk about
this issue ad nauseam, and the staff of the Notre Dame journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy for all their work during the editing process.
1. See Melissa McEwan, Impossibly Beautiful, SHAKESVILLE (May 6, 2010),
http://shakespearessister.blogspot.com/2010/05/impossibly-beautiful.html.
2. Photoshopping means to digitally edit or alter a picture or photo-
graph, and its etymology stems from Adobe Photoshop, a well-known and
widely used graphics editor. It uses tools such as an airbrush to modify photo-
graphs, by altering size, cropping, removing unwanted elements, doing selective
color changes, enhancing images, sharpening and softening images, retouching
and repairing images, correcting image distortion, changing color depth, and
adjusting crop and rotation. For a full description of Photoshop's capabilities,
see Using Photoshop CS5: Retouching and Transforming, AnoBE, http://help.adobe.
com/enUS/photoshop/cs/using/index.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
3. Cristina Everett, 'Mad Men' Star Christina Hendricks Lends Her Sex Appeal
to London Fog's Fall Campaign, NYDALYNEWs.coM (Aug. 25, 2010), http://
articles.nydailynews.com/2010-08-25/entertain ment/2707363 1_1_christina-
hendricks-london-fog-fall-campaign (quoting Dari Marder, chief marketing
officer of London Fog).
4. Dodai Stewart, Not Even Christina Hendricks Is Safe from Photoshop, JEZE-
BEL (Aug. 25, 2010, 3:24 PM), http://jezebel.com/5621871/christina-
hendricks-curves-fall-victim-to-london-fogs-photoshop/gallery/.
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ently she did not, quite naturally, complement what the company
wanted to represent.
In October 2009, Ralph Lauren released an advertisement
that featured model Filippa Hamilton. In this advertisement,
Hamilton's appearance had been photoshopped so dramatically
that her head was now larger than her waist.' Similarly, on May
26, 2010, Ann Taylor's company account tweeted an apology for
its "overzealous" photoshopping on its company website and in
its magazine. This particular instance of photoshopping was
shocking because of its sloppiness-many of the models
appeared to be made out of rubber.' Ann Taylor promised to
use "more real, beautiful images."' However, less than three
months later, Ann Taylor once again was under fire for its
photoshopping. This time, they displayed the same model in two
different ways. The first image was a thumbnail version of an
unretouched model, and the second image appeared once an
interested purchaser clicked the thumbnail. This second image
showed a different photoshopped image of the model, who now
appeared to not have ribs.'
In an advertisement for Campari liquor, Jessica Alba's post-
pregnancy waistline was praised. However, pre-photoshopped
images proved that her waistline had been slimmed, her breasts
had been enhanced, her collarbones were made more promi-
nent, and her knees were made more defined.' Likewise, Kiera
Knightly was given a breast enhancement in the 2004 King Arthur
5. Cory Doctorow, The Criticism that Ralph Lauren Doesn't Want You to See!,
BoINoBOING (Oct. 6, 2009, 10:32 AM), http://www.boingboing.net/2009/10/
06/the-criticism-that-r.html. Uproar created by this advertisement led to
attempts by Ralph Lauren to remove the image from the Internet, but the
image went viral too quickly, and can still be easily found.
6. The images no longer appear on Ann Taylor's website, but can still be
found on certain blogs. See, e.g., Jenna Sauers, Ann Taylor's Photoshop Insanity,
JEZEBEL (May 24, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://jezebel.com/5546459/ann-taylors-
photoshop-insanity.
7. Ann Taylor had tweeted apologies about its "overzealous" use of
photoshop. The tweets can no longer be found on Twitter, but are saved in
their original form on some blogs. SeeJenna Sauers, Ann Taylor Apologizes for
Photoshop Horror, JEZEBEL (May 26, 2010, 2:20 PM), http://jezebel.com/
5548382/ann-taylor-apologizes-for-photoshop-horror.
8. The images no longer appear on Ann Taylor's website, but can still be
found on certain blogs. See, e.g., Margaret Hartmann, Ann Taylor Mistakenly
Reveals Their Photoshop Process [Updated], JEZEBEL (Aug. 3, 2010, 4:45 PM), http://
jezebel.com/5603467/a-model-gets-photoshopped-before-your-very-eyes.
9. For pictures of Jessica Alba's pre- and post-photoshopped pictures see
Cara Harrington, Jessica Alba Photoshop-Before and After Photos, HOLLYWOOD
DAME (Dec. 8, 2008), http://hollywooddame.com/2008/12/08/jessica-alba-
photoshop-before-and-after-photos/.
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movie advertisements in the United States. In the advertisements
released in the United Kingdom, her image had not been
altered. Knightly has claimed that movie executives told her this
was done in case her flatter chest "turned people off."'o
Finally, then fifty-nine-year-old Twiggy was made the spokes-
person for Oil of Olay's Regenerist Definity Eye Illuminator cam-
paign in December of 2009. Twiggy's advertisement was
airbrushed to show her with softened and reduced wrinkles and
with no sign of under-eye bags or crow's feet." The words on the
advertisement claimed "Olay is my secret to brighter-looking
eyes," and that the product "reduces the look of wrinkles and
dark circles for brighter, younger-looking eyes."'
These images all seem harmless, but together they show an
epidemic of beauty that is unrealistic and impossible to reach.
This has contributed to very real problems of depression,
anorexia, bulimia, and other serious health issues among young
women. Women are at risk for life-long health problems due to
the "never-ending treadmill of unrealistic beauty attainment."' 3
Currently, in the United States alone, nearly ten million women
suffer from eating disorders such as anorexia or bulimia.'4 Forty
percent of newly diagnosed cases of eating disorders are in fif-
teen- to nineteen-year-old girls, but symptoms can start as early as
kindergarten." More than eighty percent of women are
reported to be dissatisfied with their appearance."
The growing use of photoshopping in advertisements cou-
pled with startling statistics regarding female eating disorders has
led to the serious contemplation of legislation in countries such
10. Katie Hampson, My Flat Chest Is a Turn-Off Says Keira, DAILY MAIL
ONLINE (July 19, 2006), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-395379/
My-flat-chest-turn-says-Keira.html.
11. Eventually, the Olay advertisement was banned in the United King-
dom for being misleading by their Advertising Standards Authority after almost
1,000 complaints were voiced. See Mark Sweney, Twiggy's Olay Ad Banned over
Airbrushing, GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/
2009/dec/16/twiggys-olay-ad-banned-airbrushing.
12. See id. For a comparison of Twiggy as photographed by the paparazzi
around the same time, and the image of Twiggy as portrayed by Olay, see
Twiggy Before Olay: Twiggy After Olay Airbrush Ad, CELEBGALZ (Dec. 17, 2009),
http://celebgalz.com/twiggy-before-olay-twiggy-after-olay-airbrush-ad-photos/.
13. YWCA, BEAUTY AT ANY COST: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S
BEAuTY OBSESSION ON WOMEN & GiRis 4 (2008), available at http://www.ywca.
org/atf/cf/%7B71 1d5519-9e3c-4362-b753-adl38b5d352c%7D/BEAUTY-AT-
ANY-COST.PDF.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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as England and France." Meanwhile, Australia recently released
voluntary guidelines for the fashion and publishing industries,
and the New Zealand government has also started to urge the
media to portray women accurately." In other countries, private
retailers are taking the initiative themselves and have started "no
retouching" policies.'"
Both England and France are pushing for the placement of
a "warning label" on retouched images. The purpose of such a
warning label on fashion advertisements and magazines that have
been retouched is to show that they are not real images. Repre-
sentatives explain that this legislation stems from their belief "in
the freedom of young people to develop their self-esteem and to
be as comfortable as possible with their bodies, without con-
stantly feeling the need to measure up to a very narrow range of
digitally manipulated shapes and sizes."20
In the United States, however, one blogger opined that this
type of legislation should be filed "squarely under 'would never
happen in the U.S."' 2 1 This comment stems from the First
Amendment and the recognition that there is a commercial right
of free speech, including freedom to advertise.22 The outer
boundaries of what the right covers has never fully been solidi-
fied, and therefore, what exactly the government can regulate
has led to mixed results in the Supreme Court. While earlier
decisions indicate that the Court would give substantial defer-
ence to the government in its regulation of commercial speech-
even allowing speech to be regulated in paternalistic ways-more
17. See UK.: Curb Airbrushed Images, Keep Bodies Real, CBSNEWS.com
(Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/20/world/main68
84884.shtml [hereinafter Curb Airbrushed Images]; Steven Erlanger, Point, Shoot,
Retouch, and Label?, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3, 2009, at E1.
18. See Frances Morton, Touch-up: Photoshopping Is All Around Us, N.Z. HER-
ALD (Sept. 5, 2010), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/entertainment/news/article.
cfm?c-id=1501119&objectid=10671260.
19. For example, Jacob, a Canadian retailer that specializes in clothing
for women and girls, has instituted a "no retouching" policy. See About Us-No
Retouching Policy, JACOi3, http://wwwjacob.ca/about-us/no-retouching-policy
(last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
20. Rosa Prince, Airbrushing of Photos Should Be Banned, Liberal Democrats
Say, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 3, 2009, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
politics/liberaldemocrats/5962358/Airbrushing-of-photos-should-be-banned-
Liberal-Democrats-say.html (quoting Jo Swinson, Member of Parliament for
East Dunbartonshire).
21. Barb Dybwad, Photoshopping Illegal? France Set to Regulate Airbrushed
Pics, MASHABLE TECH (Sept. 24, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/09/24/
photoshop-disclaimer/.
22. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
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recent decisions indicate uncertainty among the Court on the
issue of regulating speech and the level of deference that should
be given to the government.2 ' Therefore, the question of
whether photoshopped commercial advertisements can be regu-
lated by the government is a hotly contested area of free speech
rights.
This Note discusses this topic in four parts. Part II details
different foreign legislation and governmental action that has
been taken in regards to photoshopping, including the aims of
different countries on regulating certain trends in the modern
photoshopping of advertisements. Part III discusses commercial
free speech as it exists in the United States, with particular
emphasis on the test established in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission24 and its interpretation in the
cases that followed. Part IV focuses on advertising in America,
and considers whether the government may constitutionally
place a warning label on advertisements depicting photoshopped
images. This Note concludes that legislation mandating warning
labels on photoshopped images on advertisements could poten-
tially pass constitutional scrutiny.
II. THE CURRENT TREND IN PHOTOSHOPPING ADVERTISEMENTS
AND FOREIGN RESPONSES
Since 2009, English and French politicians have been inter-
ested in legislation regulating photoshopped images. In France,
Valerie Boyer, of the Union for a Popular Movement party, is
leading the fight.25 Boyer was inspired by an earlier bill that she
introduced into the National Assembly, the lower house of Parlia-
ment in France, which sought to ban websites that encourage
anorexia and bulimia.2 ' This bill was born during a time when
eating disorders were the subject of growing concern in France,
where "many young women are obsessive in their pursuit of
thinness."2 7
23. Compare Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328
(1986), with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
24. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
25. See Eric Pfanner, Looking at the World With a Merciless Eye: Saying No to
the Digitally Altered Photo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, at B5.
26. See id. This earlier bill drafted by Boyer "would make the promotion
of extreme dieting a crime punishable by up to two years in prison and a fine of
some $45,000. That law is largely aimed at Internet sites and blogs advocating
an 'anorexic lifestyle' like the pro-ana (for pro-anorexia) movement."
Erlanger, supra note 17, at E7.
27. Pfanner, supra note 25.
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Driven by her earlier research, Boyer has taken on a "quest
to rid the media of misleading images." 28 Boyer proposes that
any advertisement meant for public distribution-whether for
editorial purposes or as a print advertisement-would require a
warning label if the images were retouched or digitally manipu-
lated.2 ' The retouched photographs would carry the following
warning label: "Photograph retouched to modify the physical
appearance of a person."o Violators of the rule could be subject
to a fine of approximately $55,000." Boyer intended its scope to
be broad, wanting it to cover everything from newspaper and
magazine advertising to billboard photos and product packag-
ing.3 2 Within a month of presenting the bill, Boyer's proposed
legislation garnered backing from over fifty other legislators who
wished to see it introduced as formal legislation. 3
Likewise, Deputy Wladimir Costa, a member of the National
Congress of Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, is pushing a similar
bill that would also require a warning label on retouched
images.3 Costa says the goal is not to stop advertisers from using
Photoshop; instead it is to promote awareness in the consumer
that the image has been retouched. The Brazilian warning
would read: "Attention: image retouched to alter the physical
appearance of the person portrayed.""5
Jo Swinson, a member of Britain's Parliament from the Lib-
eral Democratic Party, first proposed in England a similar label-
ing system for advertisements containing altered images of
28. Id. The Times writes that this topic "consumes her." Erlanger, supra
note 17, at E6.
29. See Erlanger, supra note 17; Pfanner, supra note 25; Bruce Crumley,
France May Put Warning Labels on Airbrushed Photos, TIME WORLD (Oct. 05, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1927227,00.html.
30. See Crumley, supra note 29. Other sources report slightly different
wording, such as: "Retouched photograph aimed at changing a person's physi-
cal appearance." French MPs Want Health Warnings on Airbrushed Photographs,
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
europe/france/6214168/French-MPs-want-health-warnings-on-airbrushed-
photographs.html [hereinafter French MPs Want Health Warnings].
31. See Crumley, supra note 29.
32. See French MPs Want Health Warnings, supra note 30. In France, it is
estimated that this would result in ninety-nine percent of fashion photographs
containing such a warning. See Christiane Amanpour's Body Image in Advertising
and How We Perceive Ourselves (CNN television broadcast Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter Amanpour], available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1004/
01/ampr.01.html (comments ofJim Bittermann, CNN Correspondent).
33. See Crumley, supra note 29.
34. Tom Hennigan, Attention: Retouching Can Damage Your Health, IRIsH
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, at 19.
35. Id.
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models. The Liberal Democrats adopted the proposal as part of
their official platform in 2009. It calls for a complete ban on
altered photographs in advertisements aimed at children under
the age of sixteen. 6 Swinson's proposal calls for a warning label
that operates as a rating system. Under this rating system, all
advertising photographs would be rated on a scale, depending
on the degree of retouching. For example, the highest warning
number would constitute cosmetic changes from Photoshop, but
the lowest would reference something less severe, such as altered
lighting. Swinson's plan would work through the Advertising
Standards Authority, which already regulates the content of
advertisements in Great Britain. The hope was to encourage
advertisers to adopt the plan rather than force it upon them.
The Liberal Democrats have been pressuring the Advertising
Standards Authority by launching a website that allows consum-
ers to report instances of noticeably altered ads."
In October 2010, British officials met with advertisers, fash-
ion editors, and health experts to discuss how to curtail the cur-
rent practice of airbrushing in advertising.40 Equalities Minister
Lynne Featherstone is leading these consultations and once
again indicated that advertisers will not be required to use warn-
ing labels. Instead, the hope is that advertisers will adjust their
practices on a voluntary basis. This is similar to the policy intro-
duced in Australia, "where magazines that signed up to a code of
conduct would refrain from photo tampering. Magazines that
adhere to the guidelines will receive a 'body image tick' of
approval.""
The tradition of photoshopping within the advertising and
photography industry will undoubtedly be the biggest struggle
that these legislators face, no matter if the warning label is
optional or mandatory. Photoshopping has always had a place in
the hearts of advertisers and photographers, in their goal to offer
"an escape to a more glamorous world."42 In fact, this escape is
part of the appeal of advertisements and women's magazines.43
As advertisers argue, the placement of a warning label "under-
mines the allure of perfectly photographed people and places in
marketing campaigns, which, in many cases, is what sells. A
36. See Pfanner, supra note 25.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Curb Airbrushed Images, supra note 17.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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svelte model with perfect skin . .. is likely to make you want to eat
high-fiber cereal more than a model with visible imperfec-
tions."4 4 To those like fashion designer Karl Lagerfeld or legen-
dary photographer Dominique Isserman, "the whole point is to
create a more beautiful world, not one that is less so."45
Furthermore, fashion photographer Mark Nolan sees read-
ers as driving the content of magazines; therefore, " [t]he govern-
ment should stay away from policing the market." According to
Nolan, the government should "back right off' since
"[m]agazines should be an icon for looking your best. [Readers]
know what they get are the most glamorous, the best-looking
girls. It's always been that way."47 Advertisers and magazine edi-
tors argue that a warning label simply tells people what they
already know. As Christine Leiritz, chief editor of Marie Claire,
says, "Of course [the photographs are] all retouched," but her
"readers are not idiots, . . . especially when they see those celebri-
ties who are 50 and look 23."" Leiritz thinks it is important for
magazines, not the government, to police themselves, since
"'fashion provides a dream' that is important for women."4
While it is true that editors, advertisement managers, and
photographers have used technology to make smaller improve-
ments, such as "taming the occasional stray hair or erasing a
blemish,"o5 changes in technology have dramatically altered the
kind of retouching that can be done. It has resulted in "much
more extensive trickery [that] is approved without anyone bat-
ting a lash: flabby stomachs are tightened, necks and legs are
lengthened, and bosoms are reshaped. The result: a flawless
body shape no amount of dieting or cosmetic surgery can
achieve."5 1  Images can be manipulated in any way that is
desired, from making a model slimmer or taller to changing skin
44. See Crumley, supra note 29.
45. See Amanpour, supra note 32 (comments of Jim Bittermann, CNN
Correspondent).
46. Curb Airbrushed Images, supra note 17 (citing Mark Nolan).
47. Id. (quoting Mark Nolan).
48. Erlanger, supra note 17, at E7; see also Rik Myslewski, UK, France Mull
Photoshop Fakery Laws, REGISTER (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2009/09/29/photoshop_1aws/ ("Although guaranteeing the accuracy of
images used for editorial purposes is a laudable goal, children in the UK and
France are inured to digital enhancements and are quite able to distinguish
reality from fantasy without a rating system.").
49. Erlanger, supra note 17, at E7 (quoting Christine Leiritz).
50. Curb Airbrushed Images, supra note 17.
51. Id.
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color and swapping body parts. As Hany Farid, a professor at
Dartmouth College who specializes in digital photo forensics,
says, "The trend does seem to be more and more 'extreme
Photoshopping.' Everybody's just moving towards Barbie
dolls . . . . I don't think there's a single photograph in those
[magazines] that's not retouched. They're all manipulated to
hell."" According to Farid, most people do not understand the
extent to which photo manipulation exists in the world today-
even in things such as political campaigns.5'
While advertisers scoff at the premise of the legislation 5 -
which they interpret as implying that retouched images can
cause eating disorders 6 -politicians and lobbyists claim that that
is not their implication at all. Instead, politicians and lobbyists
emphasize that it is undeniable that the retouched photographs
are a factor that can lead to eating disorders and depression
among girls, "especially for the most vulnerable young girls."5
As Susan Ringwood, the chief executive officer of Beat, a British
52. See Morton, supra note 18; see alsoJenna Sauers, Regulating Photoshop: A
Hazy Proposition, Not A Solution, JEZBEBEL (July 26, 2010, 5:39 PM), http://jezebel.com/5596674/regulating-photoshop-a-hazy-proposition-not-a-solution.
While most Photoshop effects are in fact named for lower-tech proce-
dures that have been performed since the dawn of photography-air-
brushing, dodging and burning, and collage have all been
traditionally used to alter fashion images-the reality is that these
techniques were so labor- and time-intensive that they were rarely used
consistently and in combination. What used to take hours in a dar-
kroom can now be done in seconds. What used to be a one-shot pro-
cedure can now be reverted, re-attempted, undone, re-done, and
tweaked again and again as necessary. Never before have images been
so highly malleable, so easily "perfectable." What used to be excep-
tional and difficult has now been made easy-and it's become the
norm.
Id.
53. Curb Airbrushed Images, supra note 17.
54. Id.
55. In Brazil, Edson Aran, head of the editorial team at the Brazilian edi-
tion of Playboy, is a "heavy user of Photoshop" and described the proposal of
legislation by Deputy Costa as "too stupid to even bother commenting on."
Hennigan, supra note 34. Likewise, "[i]n France, Ines de La Fressange, a for-
mer model and clothes designer, calls Ms. Boyer's bill 'demagogic and stupid,'
arguing that the causes of anorexia are complex." Erlanger, supra note 17, at
E6.
56. See Erlanger, supra note 17, at E6 (citing de La Fressange).
57. Erlanger, supra note 17, at E6 (quoting PhillippeJeammet, professor
of psychiatry at the Universit6 Paris Descartes); see also Curb Airbrushed Images,
supra note 17 ("We know these images by themselves don't cause eating disor-
ders directly, but they certainly are an influence on people, particularly those
already ill, or seriously at risk.") (quoting Susan Ringwood, chief executive
officer of Beat).
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charity that is trying to tackle eating disorders in Britain,
explains:
Digitally sculpted models are particularly harmful to girls
trying to recover from an eating problem . . . [because]
[t]hey cannot understand why anyone worries about them
[if] when they look around them they see pictures of peo-
ple who look just like them who are celebrated as success-
ful ... . It [perpetuates] their disturbed views that they are
right.58
Britain's Royal College of Psychiatrists recently backed this
viewpoint, submitting a paper to the Advertising Standards
Agency that calls for notice on any airbrushed advertisement
marking it as such." The group of forty-four academics, doctors,
and psychologists claim that the "pictures promote unrealistic
expectations of perfection, encouraging eating disorders and
self-harm,""o and that the images "are linked to body dissatisfac-
tion and unhealthy eating in girls and women."" Swinson agrees
with this thinking, explaining, "When teenagers and women look
at these pictures in magazines, they end up feeling unhappy with
themselves.""
Images that represent "perfection" can come with a price,
which is what most concerns Boyer's legislation. As Jill Wanless,
an associate editor at the British weekly magazine, Look, says,
"Sometimes readers want hyper-reality in a way-they want to be
taken out of their own situation . . . . But there's a line that can
be crossed when you alienate them by presenting something
completely unattainable."" Boyer takes this idea one step fur-
ther and emphasizes that the "widespread use of digital technol-
ogy to alter images is feeding the public a steady visual diet of
falsified people, places, and products,"6 4 and to pass off such
58. Curb Airbrushed Images, supra note 17 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
59. SeeJames Kirkup, Airbrushed Images Harming Girls and Boys, Experts Say,
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/liberal
democrats/6516537/Airbrushed-images-harming-girls-and-boys-experts-say.
html.
60. Id.
61. HELGA DITTMAR ET AL., THE IMPACT ON BODY IMAGE AND BEHAVIOURS:
A SUMMARY OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2009), available at http://www.national
eatingdisorders.org/in-the-news/in-the-spotlight.php?year=2009 (follow Nov. 9,
2009 "PDF file" hyperlink).
62. Pfanner, supra note 25 (quoting Jo Swinson).
63. Curb Airbrushed Images, supra note 17 (quoting Jill Wanless).
64. Crumley, supra note 29 (citing Valbrie Boyer). Boyer explains that
the "schizophrenia" that exists between the real world and the world that is
represented in advertisements leads to a "standardized and brainwashed world."
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imagery as real is misleading. The artificial reality created by
these images leads the public to expect the impossible from
themselves and from the world." As Boyer argues, "When writ-
ers take a news item or real event and considerably embellish it,
they are required to alert readers by calling the work fiction, a
novel or a story based on dramatized facts. Why should it be any
different for photographs?""6 People who think like Boyer
believe that photographs that have been modified from their
original form should contain a label explaining as much-just
like food-labeling rules that mandate consumers must be alerted
of the presence of additives and preservatives.
Therefore, in a world where advertising can control what is
considered beautiful, proposals advocating for warning labels on
retouched images seek to alert consumers that these images are
not attainable. Advocates for these labels anticipate that a warn-
ing will help signal that the represented idealized beauty is noth-
ing but a "false expectation[ ] of how the world should look-
Erlanger, supra note 17, at E6-7 (quoting Valdrie Boyer). The world becomes
one in which "[i]f someone wants to make life a success, wants to feel good in
their skin, wants to be part of society, one has to be thin or skinny, and [even]
then it's not enough . . . ." Id. at E6.
65. It has also led to the increasing use of something called "reverse
retouching." Recently, Leah Hardy, a former UK Cosmopolitan editor, wrote an
article describing the process. It is also a process thatJane Druker, the editor of
Healthy magazine, Alexandra Shulman, editor of British Vogue, Robin Derrick,
creative director of Vogue, and Johnnie Boden, founder of a clothing brand,
have all admitted to using as well. This "deranged but increasingly common
process" involves using models that are "cadaverously thin and then adding fake
curves so they look bigger and healthier." Hardy describes how models would
show up the day of a shoot looking like an "anorexic waif with jutting bones and
acne." Due to retouching, however, "[t]hey had 22-inch waists (those were
never made bigger), but they also had breasts and great skin. They had teeny
tiny ankles and thin thighs, but they still had luscious hair and full cheeks."
Due to photoshopping, Hardy articulates that readers of her magazine, and of
other magazines that have admitted to using reverse retouching, "never saw the
horrible, hungry downside of skinny. That these underweight girls didn't look
glamorous in the flesh. Their skeletal bodies, dull, thinning hair, spots, and
dark circles under their eyes were magicked away by technology, leaving only
the allure of coltish limbs and Bambi eyes." She sums it up as "[a] vision of
perfection that simply [doesn't] exist. No wonder women yearn to be super-
thin when they never see how ugly thin can be. But why do models starve them-
selves to be a shape that even high fashion magazines don't want?" Leah Hardy, A Big
Fat (and Very Dangerous) Lie: A Former Cosmo Editor Lifts the Lid on Airbrushing
Skinny Models to Look Healthy, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (May 20, 2010), http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1279766/Former-Cosmo-editor-LEAH-LARDY-
airbrushing-skinny-models-look-healthy-big-fat-dangerous-lie.html (emphasis
added).
66. Crumley, supra note 29 (quoting Valhrie Boyer).
67. Id.
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and how they should look as well."" Boyer explains that the false
images create "parallel worlds: one in which everything in ads
and photos is gorgeous, slim, chic and what we aspire to, and our
daily reality of imperfection, normality and frustration that we
can't be like those other people who-literally-don't exist.""
These images lead to a standardization of beauty, which not only
promotes unrealistic expectations about body shape, but also
fails to celebrate the diversity of sizes and shapes that exist.7 o
While advertisers insist that they are creating a "dream," Boyer
insists that it rather discourages young women from exerting full
control over their lives, since they are chasing a reality that very
often does not exist.7'
International politicians and lobbyists, from Brazil to
England, are united in their belief that some sort of warning
label system on these images is necessary. At the least, they
argue, it prevents advertisements from presenting an intention-
ally fabricated picture of reality to the world. Ideally, a warning
label could prevent young women from believing that an eating
disorder is the way to achieve the perfect figure that is repre-
sented, or from becoming depressed if they do not look like the
represented figure. The question, therefore, is whether such a
law could pass in the United States, where freedom of speech is
one of the most closely guarded constitutional rights.
III. THE RIGHT TO COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH
A. The Beginnings of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
Prior to 1976, the Supreme Court held that commercial
speech was a completely unprotected category of speech, mean-
ing that the states had unlimited discretion to restrict it. This
principle was established in the 1942 decision of Valentine v.
Chrestensen,7 1 in which the Court explained "that the Constitution
imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely com-
mercial advertising"73 in terms of regulating commercial speech.
Thus, the Supreme Court refused to acknowledge that commer-
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Val6rie Boyer).
70. See Morton, supra note 18; see also Curb Airbrushed Images, supra note 17
(explaining that the government meeting with advertisers and fashion editors is
the "latest initiative . . . to force the fashion industry to show more diverse-and
realistic-kinds of beauty").
71. See Pfanner, supra note 25; see also Erlanger, supra note 17, at E7 (cit-
ing Boyer, in which she insists that the warning label is a matter of "honesty"
and questioning why lies are necessary to "dream").
72. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
73. Id. at 54.
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cial advertising could constitute speech, since "[a] law restricting
or banning particular forms of commercial advertising would
seem on its face to 'abridge the freedom of speech.""'
However, in 1976, the Supreme Court decided Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council ("Virginia
Pharmacy")." In Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court swept
away previous distinctions76 for its "commercial speech" exemp-
tion by holding that "speech which does 'no more than propose
a commercial transaction"' is still of such social value to be enti-
tied to First Amendment protection. The Court focused its
decision on the importance of the free flow of information, and
the right of the consumer to receive information.7 8 Now, with-
out a sufficient interest, the government could not regulate com-
mercial speech."
74. Ashutosh Bhagwat, A Brief History of the Commercial Speech Doctrine (With
Some Implications for Tobacco Regulation), 2 HASTINGs ScI. & TECH. L.J. 103, 105
(2010).
75. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
76. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that
advertisements dealing with political and social matters which newspapers carry
for a fee are entitled to full First Amendment protection); Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147 (1959) (holding that books that are sold for profit are entitled to
First Amendment protection); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (holding that motion pictures which are exhibited for an
admission fee are entitled to full First Amendment protection). In these cases,
despite the commercial element involved, the Court held full First Amendment
protection was necessary because expression was disseminated for profit or
through commercial channels, and therefore could not be exposed to greater
regulation just because it was not free. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION: ANAL-
YSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO JUNE
28, 2002, S. Doc. No. 108-17, at 1176 (2002). Also, the Court overturned a
State's regulation of commercial speech in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975), but managed to keep intact the "commercial speech" exception by for-
mally holding that the regulation was regulating speech that "did more than
simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual material of clear
'public interest.'" Id. at 822. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court notes that this
holding made "the notion of unprotected 'commercial speech' all but pass[ ]
from the scene." Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759.
77. 425 U.S. at 762 (citation omitted).
78. See id. at 763-64 (consumers' interest).
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest
that those decisions . . . be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Id. at 765.
79. See id. at 766-70 (explaining that "[a]rrayed against these substantial
individual and societal interests are a number of justifications for the advertis-
ing ban," but finding that the justifications that Virginia has supplied for the
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The Court refused a "highly paternalistic approach"so to
defining when the government could regulate speech. The gov-
ernment could not satisfy the sufficient interest requirement by
claiming that the speech was not in the public's best interest to
know, because knowledge could lead to results that would nega-
tively affect the consumer.8" Instead, the Court explained that
the alternative to a paternalistic approach is one in which it is
assumed that "this information is not in itself harmful, that peo-
ple will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open
the channels of communication rather than to close them."8 2
Moreover, the choice between these two approaches, "between
the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its
misuse if it is freely available,"" was not up to the Court. Rather,
the First Amendment mandates that the free flow of information
is necessary." Therefore, the government did not have com-
plete power to suppress or regulate commercial speech.
The Court, however, emphasized that its decision was a nar-
row decision, and did not grant commercial speech rights the
same full First Amendment protection that is received by other
speech, such as political speech. Rather, Virginia Pharmacy recog-
nized several important exceptions to the protection of commer-
cial speech. Among the most important of these exceptions are
false or misleading speech8 and speech concerning illegal activi-
ties or transactions." Furthermore, the Court discusses that due
ban "far from persuading us that the flow is not protected by the First Amend-
ment, have reinforced our view that it is").
80. Id. at 770.
81. Id. at 769.
82. Id. at 770.
83. Id.
84. Id. The Court's decision
introduced a strong anti-paternalistic element into commercial speech
law, arguing that the First Amendment required states to trust the abil-
ity of consumers to make good use of truthful, non-misleading com-
mercial information. By imposing substantial constraints on the
power of government to suppress or limit commercial speech, the
Court's emphasis on the social value of commercial advertising and
hostility toward paternalistic regulations opened a new era in the con-
stitutional treatment of commercial speech regulations.
Bhagwat, supra note 74, at 105 (citation omitted).
85. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
86. Id. at 772. The Virginia Pharmacy decision also mentions that
"[a]dvertising through electronic media (meaning, in 1976, broadcast televi-
sion and radio) may receive lower protection," and that "[t]he prior restraint
doctrine may not apply to commercial speech regulations." Bhagwat, supra
note 74, at 106 (citing 425 U.S. at 773, 772 n.24).
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to the attributes of commercial speech (such as being different
in nature from other types of speech, being easier to verify for
truth than other types of speech, and being more durable than
other kinds of speech), it may be less necessary to "tolerate inac-
curate statements for fear of silencing the speaker. [The State]
may also make it appropriate to require that a commercial mes-
sage appear in such a form, or include such additional informa-
tion, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its
being deceptive."" Therefore, while commercial speech is con-
stitutionally protected, there are limitations on this protection
that make regulation of such speech subject to a lower level of
scrutiny than other First Amendment speech.
B. Central Hudson and the Four-Prong Commercial Speech Test
Since the Supreme Court's decisions have recognized "the
'commonsense' distinction between speech proposing a com-
mercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject
to government regulation, and other varieties of speech,"38 the
protection "available for particular commercial expression turns
on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental
interests served by its regulation."" In order to measure the
validity of governmental restraints upon commercial speech, the
Supreme Court developed a four-prong test in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commissioner ("Central Hud-
son") that has become the core of the commercial speech
doctrine.
In Central Hudson, the Court explained that the First Amend-
ment protection of commercial speech comes from the "informa-
tional function of advertising." 0 Therefore, when looking at
regulations of commercial speech, the threshold question is
whether the commercial speech concerns truthful and lawful
activity. After all, "there can be no constitutional objection to
the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately
inform the public about lawful activity.""
However, the government's power to regulate speech is
more circumscribed when it comes to advertising that is neither
of these things. In the case of commercial speech, the govern-
ment must (1) assert a "substantial interest to be achieved by
87. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
88. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
89. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Cornm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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restrictions on commercial speech,"" and (2) the regulation
must be in proportion to the interest and be designed to achieve
the goal. Under this approach, the Court "declined to uphold
regulations that only indirectly advance the state interest
involved."" It also explained that the restrictions must be nar-
rowly drawn, extending "only as far as the interest it serves. The
government cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to the
asserted governmental interest, nor can it completely suppress
information when narrower restrictions on expression would
serve its interest as well.""
The Court concluded that a four-part analysis had devel-
oped through their decisions in commercial speech cases,
explaining:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial
speech to come within that provision, it at least must con-
cern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest.95
The test, therefore, "establishes an 'intermediate' level of
scrutiny for commercial speech regulations, less protective than
strict scrutiny, but with some teeth nonetheless."" For example,
applying the four factors in Central Hudson, the Court held that
the regulation which completely banned any advertising by elec-
tric utilities that promoted the use of electricity during the
energy crisis of the 1970s was unconstitutional because it was
more extensive than necessary to promote the government's
interest in encouraging energy conservation. 7  The Court
explained that "the commission had failed to show that its legiti-
mate interest in energy conservation could not be protected ade-
quately by more limited regulation of commercial expression.""
92. Id. at 564.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 565 (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 566.
96. Bhagwat, supra note 74, at 107.
97. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571-72.
98. EDWIN P. ROME & WILLIAM H. ROBERTS, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL
FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION IN BUSINESS 85
(1985); see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571 ( "In the absence of a showing
that more limited speech regulation would be ineffective, [the Court could not]
approve the complete suppression of Central Hudson's advertising.").
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The Court's decision in Central Hudson introduced a period
of greater tolerance for the regulation of commercial speech. In
his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun voiced his fear that the
four-part analysis established by the Court left open the possibil-
ity that a properly tailored regulation could suppress advertising
for the sole purpose of protecting consumers from information
as a means of discouraging consumption, a paternalistic
approach that the Court had previously condemned in Virginia
Pharmacy." Cases following Central Hudson proved Justice Black-
mun's concerns valid, as the Court started to show a growing def-
erence to the government.
Perhaps the best example of judicial deference to advertis-
ing legislation came in the Court's decision in Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico."o In Posadas, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a ban by the Puerto Rican
government on casino advertising directed at residents of Puerto
Rico, even though gambling was legal in Puerto Rico. The Court
concluded that Puerto Rico's "substantial" interest in discourag-
ing casino gambling by residents justified a ban on advertise-
ments targeting residents even though residents could legally
engage in casino gambling, and despite the fact that advertise-
ments aimed at tourists were permitted.'o' Applying the Central
Hudson test, the Court found that the legislature's interest in
reducing gambling in order to increase the "health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens constitutes a 'substantial' governmental
interest,"o102 and that the restriction on casino advertisements
aimed at residents was a reasonable means for the government to
reduce the demand for gambling among its citizens.' In
explaining its decision, the Court asserted that "the greater
99. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573-74 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see
Bhagwat, supra note 74, at 107. Since the Court predicated its decision on
much narrower grounds (namely, the state's failure to exclude as feasible alter-
natives less restrictive forms of regulation), the Court's decision could signal a
movement away from its earlier opinion that paternalistic reasons were not sat-
isfactory for regulating speech. See ROME & ROBERTS, supra note 98, at 125.
However, the Court did clarify that they would "review with special care regula-
tions that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-
related policy," signaling that the Court did not fully embrace paternalistic
means as a reason to regulate commercial speech. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
566 n.9.
100. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
101. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340-45.
102. Id. at 341.
103. Id. at 341-42.
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power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes
the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.""o'
Therefore, Posadas involved a statute that sought to "restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or
its content."os Earlier decisions by the Court indicated that it
was beyond the power of the government to restrain speech that
neither advocated illegal activity nor was deceptive or misleading,
simply because there might be adverse-albeit legal-effects in
allowing ideas or information to be disseminated; Posadas, how-
ever, changed this belief.' 6 This was a "flat rejection" of the
anti-paternalistic ideals that the Court voiced in Virginia Phar-
macy.107 While the Court determined that the statute passed the
Central Hudson test, it strongly implied that legislatures would
have enhanced power to regulate commercial speech when the
speech concerned "vice" products or activities-creating the so-
called "vice" exception to the commercial speech doctrine.os
Furthermore, the Court's application of the standard Central
Hudson test consisted of a much broader interpretation of its four
prongs, indicating that stiffer commercial speech regulation
would be permitted. Earlier case law indicated that once speech
is deemed not misleading, fraudulent, or illegal, "the burden is
on the government not merely to assert that it has a 'substantial'
interest, but to demonstrate the nature of that interest by some-
thing more than an ipse dixit."'O' In regards to this second
prong, the Posadas Court did not shift the burden of proof to the
government; instead it relied upon the assertions that Puerto
104. Id. at 345-46.
105. Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "'Twas
Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange, 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful", 1986 Sup. CT.
REv. 1, 2 (citation omitted) (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). Posadas was also an example "where the commercial
speech distinction, rather than shoring up the protection given to noncommer-
cial speech, provides a convenient avenue for denying protection to speakers
who may have had something unpopular to say." Alex Kozinski & Stuart Ban-
ner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 649 (1990).
106. See generally Kozinski & Banner, supra note 105.
107. Bhagwat, supra note 74, at 108; see also supra notes 80-84 and accom-
panying text.
108. See Jo-Jo Baldwin, Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech. No
Longer that Crazy Aunt in the Basement, Commercial Speech joins the Family. 44
Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996), 20 U. AmK. LirrLE ROCK
L.J. 163, 177 (1997).
109. Kurland, supra note 105, at 7; see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983).
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Rico's counsel made regarding the legislative intent."o This was
a new, extremely deferential approach.
Next, regarding the third prong, Posadas distanced itself
from establishing a governmental obligation to demonstrate that
the means chosen (here, the suppression of speech) would effec-
tively secure the ends it seeks. Here, there was "no demonstra-
tion that the means, cutting off speech, [would] effectuate any of
the hypothetical ends.""' While the Court thought that it was
clear that advertising of casino gambling aimed at Puerto Ricans
would result in increased patronage of casinos by residents of
Puerto Rico," 2 there was no evidence presented that local casino
advertising actually would lead to an increase in the amount of
gambling done by Puerto Ricans.' "
Finally, when it came to the fourth prong of the Central Hud-
son analysis, Posadas was "even more deficient."1" Earlier case law
had established that if the governmental interest could be served
as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the
excessive restriction cannot survive. Once again, the Posadas
Court did not require a demonstration that an alternative means
to the ends asserted by the State was not available."' The Court
emphasized that it was up to the legislature to decide if "counter-
speech"-the promulgation of additional speech by the State
designed to discourage gambling-would be as effective. The
Court once again deferred to the government decision." 6
The Supreme Court continued to move towards allowing
stiffer commercial speech regulation by expanding the fourth
prong of the Central Hudson test even further following its deci-
sion in Posadas. In Board of Trustees v. Fox,' 7 the Court rejected
the idea that the fourth prong required the government to use
110. The substantial interest of the government to reduce the demand
for casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico was demonstrated by the
counsel for the government of Puerto Rico, who explained the legislature's
belief that excessive gambling by Puerto Ricans "would produce serious harm-
ful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as
the disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the
fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of
organized crime." Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328,
341 (1986) (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for Appellees); see Kurland, supra
note 105, at 7-8.
111. Kurland, supra note 105, at 7.
112. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341-42.
113. See Kurland, supra note 105, at 9.
114. Id. at 10.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344.
117. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
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the "least restrictive means""' to serve the alleged governmental
interest. Rather, the Court explained that there must only be a
"reasonable fit" between the means and the ends, in which the
means are "narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective."'"
This decision showed the growing trend of greater deference to
legislative judgment, as first established in Posadas. Overall, the
end of the 1980s signaled a period in which "the commercial
speech doctrine appeared to have retreated greatly from the
strong promise of the Virginia Pharmacy decision." 20
C. The Modern Movement: Tightening of the Central
Hudson Prongs
In more recent years, the Court seems more willing to invali-
date commercial speech. restrictions, issuing a series of decisions
in numerous areas that lend strength to a new era of commercial
free speech and "substantially reviving the [commercial speech]
doctrine."'"' 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island'2 2 is perhaps the
most significant decision illustrating the Court's definitive move
away from its decision in Posadas. While the Court in 44
Liquormart was splintered and produced no majority opinion, the
eight-part principal plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens,
was guided by the principle that "[t]he objective of commercial
speech jurisprudence is to advance the consumers' interest in
receiving factual, undistorted information so that they may make
well-informed economic decisions."123 This is the reason states
118. The Central Hudson test of "least restrictive means" came from a
series of earlier cases that articulated a similar feeling. See, e.g., Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("In a series of decisions this Court has held
that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."). Cases immediately
following Central Hudson seem to follow this idea. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983). But see S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987) (applying the Central Hudson
test deferentially to Congress and explaining that Congress "reasonably could
have determined" the restrictions to be able to further the State's interest).
119. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480; see also Bhagwat, supra note 74, at 107 (explain-
ing that in Fox the Court no longer required "the government to use the least
speech-restrictive means possible; it only required a 'reasonable' fit" between
the State's interest and the regulation).
120. Bhagwat, supra note 74, at 108.
121. Id.
122. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
123. Baldwin, supra note 108, at 180; see 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at
495-500, 496 ("In accord with the role that commerical messages have long
played, the law has developed to ensure that advertising provides consumers
with accurate information about the availability of goods and services.").
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are given latitude in enacting commercial speech regulations
that protect consumers from false advertising, and it "is the rea-
son a state cannot justify censoring truthful commercial speech
in order to protect its citizenry from making decisions the state
fears will be unwise."' 24 If a commercial speech regulation pro-
motes an interest separate from fair dealing in the marketplace, a
certain amount of "special care" should be taken when reviewing
the regulation.' 2 5
The Court reiterated that the typical reason why commercial
speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than
other types of speech is due to the government's interest in pro-
tecting consumers from "commercial harms."'12  Bans that target
truthful, non-misleading speech rarely serve the purpose of pro-
tecting consumers from such commercial harms. Rather, they
"serve only to obscure an 'underlying governmental policy' that
could be implemented without regulating speech. In this way,
these commercial speech bans not only hinder consumer choice,
but also impede debate over central issues of public policy."' 2 7
Since the First Amendment directs the Court "to be especially
skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good," a teaching
that applies equally to accurate information about consumer
products, the Court should not give strong deference to such leg-
islation.'12  The decision also put to rest any thought that the
"vice" exception to the commercial speech doctrine still
existed.'22 The involvement of "vice" products would no longer
reduce the Court's scrutiny.s13 o
When attempting to fix the limits of the "special care" that
was needed to review complete bans of commercial speech, Jus-
tice Stevens indicated that it should be more demanding than
the test set forth in Central Hudson. As he explained:
124. Baldwin, supra note 108, at 180.
125. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980) (explaining that
these speech prohibitions rarely survive constitutional review)).
126. Id. at 502 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410, 426 (1993)). For example, the Court explained how earlier decisions
established that the "State may require commercial messages to 'appear in such
a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as
are necessary to prevent its being deceptive' and that it may restrict some forms
of aggressive sales practices that have the potential to exert 'undue influence'
over consumers." Id. at 498 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 503 (citation omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 513-14.
130. See Bhagwat, supra note 74, at 110.
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When a State regulates commercial messages to protect
consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales
practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer
information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with
the reasons for according constitutional protection to com-
mercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict
review. However, when a State entirely prohibits the dis-
semination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial
messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair
bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from
the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally
demands. 3 1
Therefore, the decision hints that the "special care" review of
commercial speech bans should be equivalent to strict-scrutiny
review, but stops short of declaring that truthful, non-misleading
speech is entitled to full protection under the First Amendment.
Furthermore, the plurality squarely rejected Posadas, claim-
ing that it was erroneous and would not give force to its "highly
deferential approach." 3 2 The Court found that the Posadas
decision
clearly erred in concluding that it was "up to the legisla-
ture" to choose suppression over a less speech-restrictive
policy. The Posadas majority's conclusion on that point
cannot be reconciled with the unbroken line of prior cases
striking down similarly broad regulations on truthful, non-
misleading advertising when non-speech-related alterna-
tives were available.' 3 3
While the plurality articulated no standard to be applied to this
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, it was clear that the
Court was substantially tightening the narrow tailoring require-
ment of this prong, particularly in terms of regulation on non-
misleading speech.1 3 1
131. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 500-01.
132. Id. at 509-10.
133. Id.
134. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas predicted that the Court's pre-
sent version of the fourth prong of the test would dramatically affect commer-
cial speech jurisprudence if faithfully applied to future cases. He reasoned that
in the future, there almost always would be a speech-neutral alternative availa-
ble to advance the state's interest, and therefore the Court's application of this
prong would consume the entire Central Hudson test. Justice Thomas found
that the Court's current application of the Central Hudson test was a return to
the principle in Virginia Pharmacy; where attempts to manipulate a consumer's
choices by keeping them ignorant are constitutionally impermissible. 517 U.S.
at 523-28 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Baldwin, supra note 108, at 186.
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The 44 Liquormart decision shows that the burden is once
again back on the government to prove that it has a substantial
interest in the regulation of the commercial speech, that the
means chosen effectively secure the ends that it seeks, and that
there are no reasonable, alternative means to the ends sought
that are less restrictive. In terms of the third and fourth prongs
of the Central Hudson test, post-44 Liquormart cases showed a sub-
stantial tightening of the requirements necessary for the regula-
tion to pass as constitutionally appropriate.
Regarding the third prong, the government must prove that
the particular regulation will directly and materially advance its
asserted interest.' 5 In Edenfield v. Fane,'13 1 the Court expanded
on this point. Citing back to Central Hudson, the Court explained
that the burden would not be satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture,' 3 7 "rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a
restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact allevi-
ate them to a material degree."13' Ineffective or remote support
for the regulation will therefore not suffice. Empirical data is not
necessarily required; rather the Court has "permitted litigants to
justify speech restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes
pertaining to different locales altogether, or even, in a case
applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on his-
tory, consensus, and 'simple common sense.'" 1 Unlike the
135. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S.
173, 188 (1999); see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (hold-
ing that a prohibition on displaying alcohol content on beer label did not
directly and materially advance the government's interest in curbing strength
wars between brewers due to inconsistencies in the regulatory scheme).
136. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
137. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
138. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71.
139. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (quoting
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995)). However, proper
interpretation of exactly what is necessary to show that a regulation materially
advances the government's purported interest is somewhat controversial, and
has recently caused a circuit split in terms of alcohol advertising on college
campuses. In the Fourth Circuit, the court recently agreed with the argument
that "history, consensus, and common sense support the link between advertis-
ing bans in college newspapers and a decrease in demand for alcohol among
college students" due to the fact that college student publications "primarily
target college students and play an inimitable role on campus. This link is also
supported by the fact that alcohol vendors want to advertise in college student
publications." Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 589-90
(4th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). However, an earlier decision by the Third
Circuit found a similar ban to be unconstitutional because the government did
not show that its statute would combat underage drinking to any sort of mate-
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Court's earlier cases on commercial speech, such as Posadas, the
Court now views a link between the interest of the government
and the purported means of reaching that end as being critical.
The regulation must directly advance the governmental interest;
otherwise, "a State could with ease restrict commercial speech in
the service of other objectives that could not themselves justify a
burden on commercial expression."140
Finally, the more recent cases show a substantial tightening
of the narrow tailoring requirement of the fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test. While the commercial speech restriction
must be narrowly drawn, the restrictions have only needed a "rea-
sonable fit" with the government's interest, rather than the least
restrictive means possible. However, in City of Cincinnati v. Discov-
ery Network, the Court held that the city's prohibition of commer-
cial publications to reduce the number of newsracks on the
streets did not reasonably fit the legitimate interest of reducing
visual clutter.' 4 ' The Court explained that the city could not pro-
hibit "commercial" publications but still allow newspapers since
"all newsracks, regardless of whether they contain commercial or
noncommercial publications, are equally at fault."142 This case
proved that the "'reasonable fit"' standard still "has some
teeth.""' Furthermore, "[a]s the governmental interest becomes
further removed from protecting a fair bargaining process, it
may become more difficult to establish the absence of less bur-
densome regulatory alternatives and the presence of a 'reasona-
rial degree, or that the law provides anything more than "ineffective or remote
support for the government's purposes." Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 107
(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770). The court expounded that
it agreed that, in general, the promotion of alcoholic beverages encourages
consumption, and if the statute had the effect of greatly reducing the number
of ads viewed by underage drinkers, it would have held that the third prong of
the statute had been met. However, the court explained that, because the stat-
ute only applies to a "very narrow sector of the media ... and the Common-
wealth ha[d] not pointed to any evidence that eliminating ads in this narrow
sector [would] do any good," the prong was not met. Id. at 107. Therefore,
while a split does exist, it is clear that the courts will no longer simply defer to
the legislative intent.
140. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, 527 U.S. at 188 (citing Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at
771)).
141. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417-18
(1993) ("The benefit to be derived from the removal of 62 newsracks while
about 1,500-2,000 remain in place was considered 'minute' by the District
Court and 'paltry' by the Court of Appeals. We share their evaluation of the
'fit' between the city's goal and its method of achieving it.").
142. Id. at 426.
143. S. Doc. No. 108-17, at 1182 (2002).
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ble fit' between the commercial speech restriction and the
governmental interest."' 4 4 In fact, the existence of an alternative
that either is a more limited restriction or would not freeze
speech at all may be fatal.' 45 This may mean that regulations
aiming to protect the fair bargaining process between the con-
sumer and advertiser may be more likely to withstand the scru-
tiny of the Court than regulations concerning general health or
moral concerns of the government."' 6
Overall, the commercial speech doctrine is anything but
clear. While the Court's precedent is split on exactly what consti-
tutes commercial speech, the level of protection it should be
given, and the amount of deference that should be shown to leg-
islation regulating it, the test first established in Central Hudson is
still good law and applies to any analysis concerning regulation
of commercial free speech.
Regarding the application of the Central Hudson test, the def-
erence the Court has given to the government has fluctuated
over the years. It has been true since Virginia Pharmacy that if the
speech is false, deceptive, or misleading, the government may
require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or
include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers,
as are necessary to prevent deception."' 7 However, newer cases
interpreting the Central Hudson test have moved away from a
strong deference to the legislature. Now, the government must
assert a substantial interest to be achieved by the restrictions on
the commercial speech. Next, the restriction on speech must
"directly advance" the governmental interest. Finally, the regula-
tion cannot survive if a more limited restriction exists that would
serve the government's interest just as well.
More recent Court decisions indicate that truthful, non-mis-
leading advertising may eventually receive full constitutional pro-
tection. l 48 This higher level of protection would "entail strict
scrutiny for content-based restrictions of non-misleading com-
mercial speech, resulting in an upholding of the law only if it is
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental inter-
est-a standard that is generally fatal.""4
144. Id. at 1185.
145. Id. at 1181.
146. Id. at 1185.
147. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
148. See Bhagwat, supra note 74, at 110.
149. Id. at 111.
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IV. COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH AND FASHION
ADVERTISEMENT PHOTOSHOPPING
A. Advertising in America
In a capitalistic society such as the United States, it is nearly
impossible for the average American to escape advertising. By
2000, "[t]he average American [was] exposed to at least three
thousand ads every day and will spend three years of his or her
life watching television commercials. Advertising makes up
about 70 percent of our newspapers and about 40 percent of our
mail."' AsJean Kilbourne describes, "Advertising is our environ-
ment. We swim in it as fish swim in water."1 5' More than any-
thing else in modern culture, from art to literature to newspaper
articles, advertising "allows us to track our sociological history:
the rise and fall of fads, crazes, and social movements; political
issues of the times; changing interests and tastes in clothes,
entertainment, vices, and food; and scenes of social life as they
were lived.""' As such, advertising has become so absorbed by
society that it has become the dominant culture of our times,
commanding the public's attention to a particular style of
existence."
The power in advertising lies not in its ability to actually sell
goods. "Recent studies have shown that consumers use less
advertising in decision making. Advertising is not supplying the
reason for purchasing as it did a generation ago.""' Exempting
supermarket and classified advertisements, upwards of ninety-
nine percent of advertising has no effect. It has been estimated
that of the 3,000 advertisements consumed each day, the average
consumer notices only about eighty and reacts to about twelve.'15
Therefore, advertising must exist for a reason other than to
increase sales. As James Twitchell puts it, "[d]eception is the
150. JEAN KILBOURNE, DEADiY PERSUASION: WHY WOMEN AND GIRLS MUST
FIGHT THE ADDIcTIVE POWER OF ADVERTISING 58-59 (1999); see also JAMES B.
TWITCHELL, AccuLT USA: THE TRIUMPH OF ADVERTISING IN AMERICAN CULTURE
2 (1996) ("Assuming they reach maturity with consciousness intact, the current
crop of teenagers will have spent years watching commercials. No one has done
the numbers on what happens if you factor in radio, magazine, newspaper
advertisements, and billboards, but today's teens probably have spent the
equivalent of a decade of their lives being bombarded by bits of advertising
information.").
151. KILBOURNE, supra note 150, at 57.
152. ANTHONYJ. CORTESE, PROVOCATEUR: IMAGES OF WOMEN AND MINORI-
TIES IN ADVERTISING 3 (1999).
153. See id.; see generally KILBOURNE, supra note 150.
154. TwIHELL, supra note 150, at 239.
155. Id. at 3.
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reality of [advertising culture] ."156 The social cost of advertising
comes not from its economic value, but from its ability to deliver
what is essentially a sales pitch. The cultural ramifications of this
pitch results in giving a value to objects, and in doing that, adver-
tising gives value to our lives. The biggest drawback to advertis-
ing, in the eyes of a company that advertises, is that it cannot
create desire. While "advertising cannot create desire, it can
channel it. And what is drawn down that channel, what travels
with the commercial, is our culture."' Advertising's great
power comes from its ability to decide what exactly travels with
that commercial, because "what is carried in and with advertising
is what we know, what we share, what we believe in. It is who we
are. It is us."'
Most fashion advertisers insist that advertising simply reflects
the current society and cultural attitudes or that it reflects a per-
fect dream world. However, advertising is not an imitation of
society; rather,
advertising is an effective and pervasive medium of influ-
ence and persuasion, and its influence is cumulative, often
subtle, and primarily unconscious .... It is both a creator
and perpetuator of the dominant attitudes, values, and ide-
ology of the culture, the social norms and myths by which
most people govern their behavior.' 5 9
While a particular advertisement for a fashion cosmetic line
may not specifically work, the culture that is depicted in the
advertisements certainly does. In the end, it is undeniable that
advertising influences society. The cosmetic industry grosses
over $20 billion a year. The diet industry grosses over $33 billion
a year. Dwarfing both of these massive industries is the cosmetic
surgery industry, which grosses over $300 billion annually.'
These statistics signal that the advertising world is seen as depict-
156. Id.
157. Id. at 4.
158. Id. Twitchell emphasizes the importance of studying advertising,
which he says is too important not to study. While most academics consider
advertising valueless, and therefore not important to study, Twitchell posits that
advertising culture has become so strong that it has overpowered different cul-
tures and attempts to create a "monolithic, worldwide order immediately recog-
nized by the House of Windsor and the tribe of Zulu." Commercial speech
does not try to overcome different culture, but rather to "enlist[ ] them to sing
the same tune. If ever there is to be a global village, it will be because the town
crier works in advertising." Id. at 43.
159. KILBOURNE, supra note 150, at 67.
160. See CORTESE, supra note 152, at 56; TWITCHELL, supra note 150, at
152.
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ing what is normal, leaving the average consumer fighting to
keep up with whatever image of perfection it depicts.
A successful fashion advertisement is persuasive on two
levels. On the first level, it raises the anxiety level of an individ-
ual, making the prospective consumer feel guilty, inferior, or
somehow insufficient, and persuading that person that they need
something to get rid of a particular "intrinsic defect." Next, the
advertisement should convey that it provides the solution. If the
advertisement identifies and satisfies both of these criteria, a con-
sumer is generally hooked.'"' Advertisers are constantly bom-
barding consumers, especially young women whom the
advertising world views as "prime targets" as inexperienced con-
sumers,' 62 with the message that they are inherently flawed.'6
These consumers need to change, and to eliminate whatever is
wrong with them. Advertisements come equipped with an
assumption, sometimes explicit, that something is wrong with the
consumer's physical appearance.164 This creation of the "intrin-
sic defect" is essential in order to create artificial needs to sell
unnecessary products.'6
Regardless of the intent of advertisers, the message that
comes across from fashion advertising is that what is most impor-
tant about young women is their beauty, their bodies, and their
clothes. Advertising presents an ideal image of what our culture
should be, a culture of flawlessly beautiful and extremely thin
women. As women are struck with this image in advertising over,
and over, and over again, girls of all ages get the message that in
order to fit in they, too, must be flawlessly beautiful and, most
importantly, thin. The female prototype in advertising is young
(with no lines or wrinkles), good-looking, sexual, and perfect
(with no scars or blemishes, and usually even no freckles, birth-
marks, or pores).'6 6 More destructive is the message from adver-
tisers that this idealized image can be achieved through hard
work, effort, and self-sacrifice."' Despite the fact that the image
itself is a facade, advertisements insist that the look can be
161. See CORTESE, supra note 152, at 62-63.
162. KILBOURNE, supra note 150, at 129 ("Adolescents are . . . prime
targets. They are in the process of learning their values and roles and develop-
ing their self-concepts. Most teenagers are sensitive to peer pressure and find it
difficult to resist or even to question the dominant cultural messages perpetu-
ated and reinforced by the media.").
163. See CORTESE, supra note 152, at 62-64; KuBOURNE supra note 150, at
108-54.
164. See CORTESE, supTa note 152, at 63.
165. See KILBOURNE, supra note 150, at 71.
166. CORTESE, supra note 152, at 54.
167. KILBOURNE, supra note 150, at 132.
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achieved through the purchase of vast quantities of beauty prod-
ucts or designer clothing.'6" Regardless of what advertisers say,
the amount of money generated from the fashion industry cre-
ates such an enormous financial stake in the advertisement
world's narrow ideal of femininity that the industry must keep
the image going. In order to continually increase revenue, they
must insist that this image is the cultural norm, and that it can be
attained. Therefore, the industry continues with a constant
stream of their representation of perfect, and unattainable,
female beauty. 169
B. Fashion Advertising and Regulation: The Central Hudson Test
Therefore, the question arises regarding the government's
ability to alert young women to the amount of photoshopping
done in advertising, in order to break the cycle created by the
"intrinsic defect." If the government were to place some sort of
warning label on photoshopped images (either a more general
label that simply provides that the image has been retouched or a
more specific warning that ranks the extent to which an image
has been retouched), would this legislation pass the test estab-
lished in Central Hudson?17 0
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that fashion
advertising is commercial speech. While fashion editors may
attach strong rhetoric to the contrary, claiming it is the creation
of a "dream world," this argument does not circumvent the fact
that, at its core, it seeks nothing more than a commercial pur-
pose to sell clothes, or make-up, or a brand.' 7 1
1. The First Prong: Deceptive or Misleading Speech
The first prong of the Central Hudson test asks if the speech is
misleading or deceptive in nature. If it is either misleading or
deceptive, then the speech deserves no First Amendment protec-
tion, and any further analysis under the Central Hudson test is
unnecessary. If fashion advertisements fail this first prong, then
the government is free to regulate the advertisements.
It is arguably true that many fashion advertisements would
fail this first prong, since many ads clearly do mislead. For exam-
ple, the Twiggy advertisement for Olay Definity Eye Illuminator
was found to be misleading in England, and was pulled from cir-
168. See CORTESE, supTa note 152, at 54.
169. Id. at 54-57.
170. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
171. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
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culation.' 2  The United Kingdom's Advertising Standards
Authority explained that they decided to ban the advertisement
because the post-production retouching gave consumers a "mis-
leading impression of the effect the product could achieve."' 7 3
It seems unwise for possible government regulation of
photoshopping to rely on fashion advertisements not passing the
first prong of the Central Hudson test for two reasons. First, the
law is not as simple as making a quick judgment on an advertise-
ment as being misleading or deceptive. The Federal Trade Com-
mission ("FTC") defines a misleading advertisement as one that
contains a material representation, either express or implied, or
a material omission of fact that is likely to mislead consumers
acting reasonably under the totality of the circumstances.174 An
express claim would be a misstatement of fact on the product
label, and an implied claim typically means the message that a
consumer can infer from the advertisement when considered in
the entire context of the advertisement. The Commission con-
siders whether the advertisement is misleading from the perspec-
tive of a person acting as a reasonable consumer under the
circumstances, and this standard may change if an advertisement
is aimed at particularly sophisticated or vulnerable groups. A
representation is material if it is "likely to affect a consumer's
choice or use of a product or service," meaning that the targeted
consumer would have chosen differently if not for the deception
in the advertisement.' 7 5
The next concern is the FT C's long held belief that adver-
tisements using "puffery" do not warrant enforcement action.
"Puffery" is a legal term used to describe advertisements that
express subjective views in such a way that no reasonable person
could take them literally. While both literally false and literally
172. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
173. See Sweney supra note 11 (quoting the Advertising Standards Author-
ity ruling).
174. Carter Dillard, False Advertising, Animals, and Ethical Consumption, 10
ANIMAL L. 25, 46 (2004). The Lanham Act creates a federal cause of action for
false advertising in interstate commerce, allowing for a broad range of reme-
dies, from injunctive relief and damages to corrective advertising. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125 (2010). However, "courts have almost universally rejected consumer
actions, holding that a plaintiff must suffer some sort of commercial . . . injury
to have prudential standing and have consistently rejected consumer
actions. . . . [T]his has effectively limited Lanham actions to claims between
competing sellers." Dillard, supra note 174, at 38 (emphasis and footnote
omitted).
175. Dillard, supra note 174, at 48 (quoting Fed. Trade Comm'n, Enforce-
ment Policy Statement on Food Advertising, FTC.cov (May 1994), http://www.ftc.
gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-food.shtm).
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true-but-misleading advertisements are actionable, puffery deliv-
ers vague, subjective assertions that the law generally holds does
not deceive substantial numbers, and therefore is neither mis-
leading nor harmful. 77 By legal definition, "puffery claims
praise the advertised item by using subjective terms, stating no
fact explicitly, and thus representing no factual content to con-
sumers and so creating no basis for them to believe anything
about the item that would affect their purchasing decision."' 7 7
The FTC and advertisers explain that because the "puffs" are sub-
jective opinions, they cannot amount to objective facts. This can
be a tough line to draw, as the line between a subjective opinion
and an objective statement of fact can be almost nonexistent.' 7 8
However, the most widely adopted rule provides the following:
"only a deceptive claim is illegal, whether or not it is false. What is
not deceptive is not illegal, whether or not it is true."17 1 Puffery
proves that not every example of false advertising is deemed
deceptive and actionable.
This, therefore, sets up a standard in which an advertise-
ment must be judged on a case-by-case basis, making it impossi-
ble to say that all advertisements in which photoshop is used are
misleading or deceptive. After all, not every false advertisement
will be considered deceptive, and not all factually true advertising
will be considered non-deceptive. However, if the speech is mis-
leading or deceptive, the use of additional information, warn-
ings, or disclaimers may be required to prevent deception by a
consumer, a mandate first established in Virginia Pharmacy. Once
again, it is inevitable that some of the most obvious uses of
photoshopping would satisfy this threshold requirement. For
purposes of reaching all photoshopped images, and to ensure
the legality of placing some sort of warning regarding the
amount of photoshopping done in an advertisement, the placing
of such a warning must satisfy the other prongs of the Central
Hudson test. After all, it is those advertisements that are not obvi-
ously deceptive that are perhaps most worrisome in terms of
effect on a young consumer.
176. See IvAN L. PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLow-Ur: PUFFERY IN
ADVERTISING AND SELLING 24 (rev. ed. 1996).
177. Id. at 12.
178. See Dillard, supra note 174, at 51-52 (citing Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa
John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir. 2000), where the Fifth Circuit held
that the phrase "Better Ingredients. Better Pizza." was puffery since the word
"better" was used in an unquantifiable context and therefore stated opinion).
179. PRESTON, supra note 176, at 5.
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2. The Second Prong: The Government's Interest in
Regulating Fashion Advertisements
In order for the government to regulate commercial speech,
the government must first prove that they have a substantial
interest in regulating the speech and that interest will be
advanced by the restrictions on commercial speech. Due to the
alarming side effects of youths' exposure to photoshopped
images in advertising, it seems that the government would clearly
be able to demonstrate a substantial interest in the placement of
a warning label system on photoshopped advertisements indicat-
ing that the image was not realistic.
It is nearly impossible for young people to avoid advertising.
Advertisers are notorious for promoting a "beauty ideal" or "the
exemplary feminine prototype," and thus are a major force of the
construction of beauty in a culture.so Our culture has a dra-
matic over-representation of thin female models compared to
the actual population of adult women. The ideal body weight as
depicted in advertisements has continuously decreased, so that
the average model depicted in an advertisement is more than
twenty percent underweight.s' As the ideal female body size
decreases, growing empirical evidence shows that this has a role
in fueling women's body dissatisfaction and increasing the inci-
dence of eating disorders.' 8 2 On average, studies have demon-
strated that young women feel worse after exposure to thin
images than other types of images.' 8 3 In fact, body dissatisfaction
is so common now that it can be described as "normative discon-
tent," which also suggests that the thinning image of beauty por-
trayed in advertising can be detrimental to a large number of
women.184
Images depicted in advertising perpetuate unreachable stan-
dards for women in almost every imaginable way. Furthermore,
these images not only affect how women view themselves, but
180. See Katherine Frith, Ping Shaw & Hong Cheng, The Construction of
Beauty: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Women's Magazine Advertising, 55 J. COMM. 56,
57 (2005) (quoting GERMAINE GREER, THE WHOLE WOMAN (1999); CORTESE,
supra note 152).
181. Emma Halliwell & Helga Dittmar, Does Size Matter? The Impact of
Model's Body Size on Women's Body-Focused Anxiety and Advertising Effectiveness, 23 J.
Soc. & C[.INICAL PSYCHOL. 104, 105 (2004).
182. Id. at 105-06.
183. Id. at 106.
184. Id. at 107 (quoting Judith Rodin, Lisa Silberstein, & Ruth Striegel-
Moore, Women and Weight: A Normative Discontent, in 32 NEBRASKA SvMPOsIUM ON
MOTIVATION, 1984: PSYCHOLOGY AND GENDER 267 (Theo B. Sonderegger ed.,
1985).
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also how men judge the real women in their lives. One study has
shown that males downgraded the physical attractiveness of an
average-looking female and were harsher in evaluations of poten-
tial dates after having watched one episode of the 1970s show
Charlie's Angels, a show featuring three beautiful, thin women, as
compared to males who watched a different program.'8 5
Another study has shown that male college-aged students who
viewed centerfolds from magazines such as Playboy were more
likely to thereafter find their own girlfriends less sexually
attractive.1 8 6
However, the most alarming standard is the one internalized
by women themselves. 187 As young women try to make sense of
what is expected of them in society, advertising delivers a very
clear message that they are expected to be flawlessly beautiful
and very thin. In a culture that can be toxic to a young woman's
self-esteem, advertising rises above as one of the most potent
messengers.' As the YWCA reports:
Engulfed by a popular culture saturated with images of ide-
alized, air-brushed and unattainable female physical
beauty, women and girls cannot escape feeling judged on
the basis of their appearance. As a result, many women
feel chronically insecure, overweight and inadequate, as
these beauty images apply to an ever-shrinking pool of
women. Moreover, the diet, cosmetic and fashion indus-
tries are often too willing to exploit these narrow beauty
standards so women and girls will become cradle-to-grave
consumers of beauty products, cosmetic surgery and diet
programs.' 8 9
Advertisers cannot even use the excuse that "thin sells" any-
more, since studies have proven there is no empirical support for
185. Douglas T. Kenrick & Sara E. Gutierres, Contrast Effects and Judgments
of Physical Attractiveness: When Beauty Becomes a Social Problem, 38 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PsycHoL. 131, 132-34 (1980).
186. See Douglas T. Kenrick, Sara E. Gutierres & Laurie L. Goldberg,
Influence of PopularErotica on Judgments of Strangers and Mates, 25J. EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 159 (1989).
187. Halliwell and Dittmar's study also proves that adult, non-student
women can be negatively affected by the use of slim models in advertising, prov-
ing that this "phenomenon" is not limited to young women. See Halliwell &
Dittmar, supra note 181, at 119-20.
188. See KILBOURNE, supra note 150, at 131-32.
189. YWCA, supra note 13, at 2.
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the proposition that extremely thin models sell products
better. 90
Statistics indicate that women, starting at increasingly earlier
ages, suffer from unrealistic and unreachable idealized notions
of beauty. For example, the more frequently girls read
magazines, the more likely they are to diet and to feel that
magazines influence their ideal body shape. Another study has
shown that seventy percent of college women feel worse about
their looks after reading women's magazines.191 Teenage girls
who watch television commercials depicting underweight models
become more dissatisfied with their own bodies.19 2
The amount of advertising that a young woman sees can
change the way that a young woman perceives the shape of her
own body, indicating that body image is influenced by observing
idealized body shapes. A woman's perception of her body is a
psychological construct, meaning that an individual woman's
self-image is part of her mental construction of her self."' Body
image has been proven to be elastic, and can fluctuate in
response to media content that focuses on the presentation of
the ideal body shape, even if media content is minimal. Today,
average young women are found to overestimate the size of their
own bodies, in a society where the ideal body is becoming thin-
ner. Women with eating disorders are found to make even
greater overestimations.' 9 4 One-third of young women between
the ages of eight and seventeen have a distorted perception of
their own weight.'9
Exposure to media that touts unrealistically thin ideals of
beauty affects young women at an early age. Girls as young as
nine have internalized thin ideals; for example, in a study of one-
hundred girls between nine and twelve-years-old, forty-nine per-
cent expressed a desire to be thinner.'1 6 Eighty-one percent of
190. See Halliwell & Dittmar, supra note 181, at 118 (concluding that
while attractiveness can influence advertising effectiveness, model thinness does
not).
191. See KILBOURNE, supra note 150, at 132-33.
192. See YWCA, supra note 13, at 6.
193. Philip N. Myers, Jr. & Frank A. Biocca, The Elastic Body Image: The
Effect of Television Advertising and Programming on Body Image Distortions in Young
Women, 42 J. COMM. 108, 108 (1992).
194. Id. at 109.
195. Ju1' SCHOENBERG ET AL., GIRL SCOUT RESEARCH INST., THE NEW NOR-
MAL? WHAT GIRLS SAY ABOUT HEALTHY LIVING 8 (2006), available at http://
girlscouts.org/research/publications/original/gs-execsummary.pdf.
196. See Levina Clark & Marika Tiggemann, Appearance Culture in Nine- to
12-Year-Old Girls: Media and Peer Influences on Body Dissatisfaction, 15 Soc. DEV.
628, 639 (2006).
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ten-year-olds are afraid of being fat."' Over one-half of teenage
girls use unhealthy weight control methods such as skipping
meals, fasting, smoking cigarettes, vomiting, and taking laxa-
tives. ' 8  Sixty-seven percent of women between the ages of
twenty-five and forty-five are trying to lose weight. Of these
dieters, fifty-three percent are already at a healthy weight and still
trying to lose weight.' 9 More than one in three "normal dieters"
will progress to pathological dieting.200
In the United States, nearly ten million women suffer from
an eating disorder. Forty percent of newly diagnosed eating dis-
orders are in girls fifteen to nineteen years-old. Symptoms can
occur, however, in girls as young as five-years-old.' More than
eighty percent of women are reported to be dissatisfied with their
appearance. 202 Furthermore, as minority women become "accul-
turated," meaning as values are absorbed by minority cultures,
the "dominant standards of beauty are internalized" and minor-
ity women may be more susceptible to eating disorders. 203
Advertising cannot cause an eating disorder. Eating disor-
ders are complex conditions that arise from a combination of
long-standing factors, including biological, emotional, and social
factors. However, retouched images of women that are unrealis-
tically thin "certainly contribute to the body-hatred so many
young women feel and to some of the resulting eating problems,
which range from bulimia to compulsive overeating to simply
being obsessed with controlling one's appetite."204 Advertising
does not promote healthy lifestyles; rather, it contributes to abu-
sive and abnormal cultural attitudes about thinness. "It thus pro-
vides fertile soil for those obsessions to take root in and creates a
197. NAT'L EATING DISORDERS Assoc., FACT SHEET ON EATING DISORDERS
(2010) [hereinafter FACr SHEET] (citing Suzanne W. McNutt et al., A Longitudi-
nal Study of the Dietary Practices of Black and White Girls 9 and 10 Years Old at
Enrollment: The NHLBI Growth Health Study, 20 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 27
(1997)), available at http://www.nationaleatingdisorders.org/uploads/file/in-
the-news/In%20the%2News%2OFact%2OSheet%20PDF.pdf.
198. Id. (citing DIANNE NEUMARK-SZTAINER, IM LIKE SO FAT!: HELPING
YOUR TEEN MAKE HEALTHY CHOICES ABOUT EATING AND EXERCISE IN A WEIGHT
OBSESSED WORLD 5 (2005)).
199. See YWCA, supra note 13, at 4.
200. FACT SHEET, supra note 197.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. NAT'L EATING DISORDERS Assoc., EATING DISORDERS IN WOMEN OF
COLOR: EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS (2005), available at http://www.
nationaleatingdisorders.org/nedaDir/files/documents/handouts/WomenCol.
pdf.
204. KILBOURNE, supra note 150, at 135.
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climate of denial in which these diseases flourish."2 " Advertisers
that not only use thin models, 206 but then retouch them to look
even thinner, help perpetuate a cultural norm from which most
women feel out of touch. The National Eating Disorders Associa-
tion has found that one of the most pertinent social factors that
can contribute to eating disorders is cultural pressures that glo-
rify "thinness," as well as narrow definitions of beauty that
include only one certain body type. 20 7 Furthermore, psychologi-
cal factors that can contribute to eating disorders are low self-
esteem, depression, and feelings of inadequacy. 208
Therefore, the government would seem to have a significant
interest in regulating fashion advertisements in some form. A
recent survey found that nearly ninety percent of young women
felt that the fashion industry and the media put a lot of pressure
on them to be thin; and sixty percent of young women compare
their bodies to fashion models-despite the fact that almost the
same percentage finds the body image represented by the fash-
ion industry to be too skinny.209 Nearly half of the young women
surveyed wished they were as skinny as the models in fashion
advertisements, and that these models provide an ideal body
shape to which they strive. 2 10 The alarming side effects of these
statistics create a substantial interest for the government to pro-
mote awareness of retouching and unrealistic images in advertis-
ing through the use of a warning label on photoshopped images.
3. The Third Prong: The Government's Regulation Must
Directly Advance Its Interest
The proposed regulation must also directly advance the gov-
ernmental interest. This burden will not be satisfied by specula-
tion, but rather requires a showing that the restriction will
alleviate proven harms in a material way. This can be proven by
empirical evidence, but at times has been proven by a common
205. Id.
206. "Most fashion models are thinner than 98% of American women."
FACT SHEET, supra note 197 (citing LINDA SMOLAK, NATIONAL EATING DISORDERS
ASSOCIATION/NEXT DOOR NEIGHBORS PUPPET GUIDE BOOK (1996)).
207. NAT'L EATING DISORDERS Assoc., FACTORS THAT MAY CONTRIBUTE TO
EATING DISORDERS (2004), available at http://www.nationaleatingdisorders.org/
uploads/file/information-resources/Factors%20that%20may%20Contribute
%20to%2OEating%2ODisorders.pdf.
208. Id.
209. GIRL SCOUT RESEARCH INST., BEAuTY REDEFINED: GIRLS AND BODY
IMAGE (2010), available at http://www.girlscouts.org/research/pdf/beauty
redefined-factsheet.pdf.
210. Id.
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sense justification.2 11 A warning label system placed on advertise-
ments with photoshopped images would satisfy this prong.
First, often regulations that failed the third prong had inco-
herent inconsistencies throughout the regulatory plan. For
example, if a regulatory scheme prohibited one form of advertis-
ing, but allowed another similar form, then the scheme is
unlikely to pass the third prong.212 If the government were to
place a warning label on advertisements with photoshopping, the
regulation would apply across the board to photoshopped
images. Next, there are numerous studies that link photoshop-
ped images in advertising that reinforce images of beauty with
problems ranging from self-esteem to serious health problems in
young women.2 11 Such a strong link has already caused the Brit-
ish Royal College of Psychiatrists to strongly suggest that a notice
be placed on any airbrushed advertisement. 21 4
Therefore, not only does empirical evidence exist that estab-
lishes that the government's interest would be materially
advanced by the regulation of speech, common sense says as
much as well. In an advertising world, the barrage of images of
idealized perfection has led young women to maintain unrealis-
tic expectations of what is "normal" and "beautiful." Having a
label on photoshopped images in advertisements, literally warn-
ing them that what they see is not reality, seems an obvious way to
alleviate the horrendous effects that advertising can have on
young women.
4. The Fourth Prong: The Regulation Must Not Be More
Extensive Than Necessary to Serve the Purported
Interest of the Government
Finally, the regulation cannot be more extensive than neces-
sary to serve the purported interest of the government. The reg-
ulation need not be the least restrictive means possible, but it
must "reasonably fit" the interest. It seems likely that the place-
ment of a warning label on advertisements with photoshopped
images would reasonably fit the government's interest in
assuaging the impact that these images of idealized beauty can
have on young women.
211. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995) (find-
ing that the regulatory scheme failed the third prong when the government
prohibited advertising the amount of alcohol content on a beer label, but not
in a general advertisement for the beer); Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96 (3d
Cir. 2004).
213. See supra notes 167-95 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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Recent cases such as 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island"'
suggest that the Court will no longer give strong deference to
regulation that promotes an interest separate from fair dealing in
the marketplace. Instead, the Court has hinted that a certain
amount of "special care" should be taken when reviewing the reg-
ulation. Furthermore, broad paternalistic reasons given by the
government can no longer be justified.'"
A regulation on photoshopped advertisements would most
likely have a paternalistic purpose, promoting an interest from
fair dealing in the marketplace. Justice Stevens' plurality opinion
in 44 Liquormart makes clear that the objective of commercial
speech jurisprudence is to advance the consumers' interest in
receiving factually undistorted information so that they may
make well-informed economic decisions."' A warning label on
fashion advertisements is in a unique position because it would
seek to increase the factual accuracy of information received
through fashion advertisements, but the main purpose of doing
so would be for a paternalistic reason, namely, to raise awareness
about the incredible amount of retouching done in advertise-
ments in order to prevent the alarming side effects of young
women's exposure to such photoshopped images. However, an
easy argument can be made that such a regulation would allow
consumers in general to make more-informed economic deci-
sions. After all, Americans spend over $40 billion a year on diet-
ing and diet-related products.2 1 Such a massive dollar figure
shows that advertising, which includes photoshopped images of
idealized beauty, does have a very real impact on economic
choices. Therefore, even under the current anti-paternalistic
theory of commercial free speech, a regulation alerting the con-
sumer public about the use of photoshopping would likely be
constitutionally permissible.
Furthermore, recent cases on commercial free speech have
made it clear that there has been a substantial tightening of the
narrow tailoring requirement of this prong of the Central Hudson
test. The Court in 44 Liquormart made it clear that suppression of
speech cannot be chosen over a less speech-restrictive policy, or
if a speech-neutral alternative was available to advance the same
governmental interest. Here, the hypothetical regulation would
not go so far as to stifle commercial speech by putting a ban on
photoshopping, or even enacting a statute that forces advertisers
215. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
216. See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
218. FACT SHEET, supra note 197.
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to only use a certain amount of photoshopping. It is only alert-
ing consumers that the image that they are looking at has some
level of retouching done. No other method seems to exist that
could advance this purpose of exposing the images for being
unrealistic other than through the implementation of a warning
label system.
Furthermore, the idea of "counterspeech" 2 9 rather than
using a warning label to regulate speech is not as effective. The
number of advertisements that the government would have to
release to counter the impression given by photoshopping in
advertisements would be unrealistic. Furthermore, most people
are aware on some abstract level that photoshopping is done, but
are not aware of the extent that it is done. Therefore, for those
images that are photoshopped the "best"-meaning they are not
deceptive-the counterspeech by the government would likely
prove ineffective.
Finally, Congress has already considered non-speech related
mechanisms to serve its interest. The Healthy Media for Youth
Act, introduced in Congress in 2010, is bipartisan legislation that
would establish a national task force to develop voluntary guide-
lines and other measures to promote positive media images of
girls and women. 220 The bill would support media literacy pro-
grams, promote research on the effect of media images on young
people, and encourage the adoption of voluntary guidelines to
promote healthier media images for youth.2 2' Such a "multi-pro-
nged attack"222 shows that Congress is considering non-speech
related mechanisms. A warning label system on photoshopped
images in advertisements would only complement the overall
desire of Congress to promote "healthy media."
Overall, a warning label system on retouched fashion adver-
tisements could pass the Central Hudson test. While some ads
would undeniably be stopped at the threshold issue, if the adver-
tisement was misleading or deceptive, the standard for what con-
stitutes "misleading" is too elusive to guard against the trickiest
advertising affecting young girls, namely, advertising in which
retouched images are not as obvious, allowing more young peo-
ple to believe the images are natural. Therefore, it is essential
for the regulation to satisfy the rest of the Central Hudson test.
219. See Posadas de P. R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U.S. 328, 344
(1986).
220. Healthy Media for Youth Act, H.R. 4925, 111th Cong. (2010).
221. Id. §§ 3-5.
222. See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583, 591 (4th
Cir. 2010) (approving the use of a similar "multi-pronged attack" on underage
and abusive drinking).
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While the underlying purpose of the regulation might be pater-
nalistic in nature, the regulation would also allow for more
authenticity in advertisements than currently exists, rather than
prohibiting certain commercial messages, which the Court pre-
fers to avoid. Furthermore, the fashion and diet industry is a
multi-billion dollar industry that relies on a continuing desire to
look better. The warning label system would certainly help with
consumer choices, and assist consumers in making well-informed
economic decisions. Finally, the placement of a warning label
would be the most effective and least speech-prohibitive means
of raising awareness of the retouched images.
V. CONCLUSION
Our society today is one driven by advertising. The average
American is exposed to about three-thousand advertisements on
a daily basis.' As changes in technology make more extensive
photoshopping easier, the trend in advertising is towards
"extreme photoshopping." With the click of a few buttons, the
female prototype in these advertisements is created: young, good-
looking, sexual, perfect, and above all, thin. Images are easily
manipulated without a second thought. However, this has led to
an epidemic of beauty that is literally unrealistic and impossible
to meet. The losers in this battle are not the fashion advertisers
who have created a multi-billion-dollar industry-it's young
women.
The health implications of young women trying to attain an
unrealistic, idealized image are substantial. Young women suffer
from very real problems, including depression, low self-esteem,
and eating disorders. This has led to the introduction of regula-
tions in several foreign countries that would institute a warning
label system on photoshopped images.
Even with the First Amendment protection of speech, the
United States could nevertheless enact legislation allowing for a
warning label system on advertisements depicting photoshopped
images. While the regulation must not be more oppressive than
necessary, only a complete ban of honest commercial speech is
close to being granted full First Amendment rights. Therefore,
since the government has a real and demonstrated interest in the
health of young women that a warning label would directly and
materially advance, and the regulation of commercial speech by
the warning label is no more extensive than necessary to advance
the government's interest, the use of a warning label could pass
constitutional muster.
223. KILBOURNE, supra note 150, at 58.
